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Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Steven Anthony Lang & Olayemi Isaac Falusi, Misc. Docket AG No. 86, September Term 2016, filed August 16, 2018. Opinion by Barbera, C.J.

Watts, J., concurs and dissents.

https://www.courts.state.md.us/data/opinions/coa/2018/86a16ag.pdf

ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT – DISCIPLINE – INDEFINITE SUSPENSION

Facts:

Petitioner, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland ("AGC"), acting through Bar Counsel, filed in the Court of Appeals a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action ("Petition") against Respondents, Steven Lang and Olayemi Isaac Falusi. The Petition alleged that both Respondents had committed violations of the Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct ("MLRPC") 1.1 (Competence), 1.2 (Scope of Representation), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4 (Communication), 1.5 (Fees), 1.15 (Safekeeping of Property), 1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation), 3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal), 5.5 (Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of Law), 7.1 (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services), 7.5 (Firms Names and Letterheads), 8.1 (Bar Admissions and Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4 (Misconduct). Additionally, Mr. Lang was accused of violating Maryland Rules 16-603 (Duty to maintain account), 16-604 (Trust account—Required deposits), and 16-606.1 (Attorney trust account record-keeping), while Mr. Falusi, for his part, was accused of violating Maryland Code Annotated, Business Occupations & Professions ("BOP") § 10-601. Those violations stemmed from Respondents' conduct as partners of Lang & Falusi, LLP; their representation of multiple clients; Mr. Falusi's application to the Bar of Maryland; and Bar Counsel's investigation of Respondents.

This Court assigned the matter to the Honorable Robin D. Gill Bright (the "hearing judge") to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make findings of fact and conclusions of law. The hearing judge found, among other things, that the firm's website and letterhead misrepresented where the attorneys were barred and their respective practice areas. The hearing judge also found that the attorneys' firm never opened an attorney trust account. Thus, the firm's operating account was used to hold client funds, make payments on behalf of clients, receive legal fees, and make

personal purchases wholly unrelated to the law firm. Mr. Falusi also failed to communicate with opposing counsel and practiced law without a license. Mr. Lang assisted Mr. Falusi in his unauthorized practice of law and failed to appear at a court-scheduled hearing without prior approval.

Held:

The Court of Appeals concluded that both Respondents violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.16, 5.5, 7.1, 7.5, 8.1, and 8.4. Mr. Falusi also violated Maryland Code Annotated, BOP § 10-601. In addition to the above violations, Mr. Lang violated MLRPC 1.15 and Maryland Rules 16-603, 16-604, and 16-606.1. The Court held that Mr. Falusi violated Rule 5.5 and Business Occupations & Professions § 10-601 by practicing law in Maryland without a license. Mr. Lang violated MLRPC 5.5 by facilitating Mr. Falusi's unauthorized practice of law. Both Respondents violated MLRPC 1.1 by failing to appear at a hearing, failing to respond to a motion to dismiss, and repeatedly failing to do anything of substance in their client's case. For those same reasons, both Respondents also violated MLRPC 1.3.

Both Respondents also violated MLRPC 1.2(a) by failing to inform their client of the consequences of Mr. Lang's failure to appear at a hearing and failing to update their client that the court ordered his foreclosure to proceed. For those same reasons, both Respondents violated MLRPC 1.4. The Court agreed with the hearing judge that Respondents violated MLRPC 1.5 by charging their client a $3,500 flat fee and then doing little to no work on the case. Although Mr. Lang violated MLRPC 1.15 and Maryland Rules 16-603, 16-604, and 16-606 by failing to create and maintain an attorney trust account, Mr. Falusi did not violate these rules because he was not a Maryland-licensed attorney at the time of the violations. Both Respondents violated MLRPC 1.16 by failing to return a client's file in a timely manner. Moreover, due to the misleading nature of the firm's letterhead and website, Respondents violated MLRPC 7.1 and 7.5.

This Court disagreed with the hearing judge regarding violations of MLRPC 8.1 and held that Mr. Lang had violated MLRPC 8.1 when he misled Bar Counsel about the firm's operating account. Mr. Falusi violated MLRPC 8.1(b) when he failed to disclose that he was the subject of a disciplinary complaint before he was admitted to the Maryland Bar. Moreover, Mr. Falusi violated MLRPC 8.1(a) when he told Bar Counsel that he had no relationship with a client, even though the evidence clearly showed that Mr. Falusi was heavily involved in the client's representation. In addition, many of the above violations constituted violations of Rule 8.4(a)-(d) because the acts involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.

When considering Mr. Lang's sanction, this Court looked to past cases where it indefinitely suspended attorneys for greater misconduct, and with fewer mitigating circumstances. Hence, an indefinite suspension is appropriate for Mr. Lang. As for Mr. Falusi, his inexperience, absence of prior discipline, and relatively minor violation of 5.5 warrants a sanction less than disbarment. Hence, an indefinite suspension is the proper sanction for Mr. Falusi's transgressions.

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Ronald Baez v. State of Maryland, No. 351, September Term 2017, filed August 31, 2018. Opinion by Raker, J.

https://mdcourts.gov/data/opinions/cosa/2018/0351s17.pdf

FOURTH AMENDMENT ¬ ARREST, STOP, OR INQUIRY – GROUNDS

Facts:

Appellant Ronald Baez appealed his conviction of possession of marijuana in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. The police stopped appellant's car based on a belief that the window tinting exceeded 35%. The officers smelled marijuana and searched the vehicle, discovering 747 grams of marijuana. Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the stop was illegal. He argued that Md. Code, Transportation Article, § 22-406 applies only to automobiles registered in Maryland and that his automobile displayed Virginia tags. The trial court denied his Motion to Dismiss and, following the presentation of an agreed statement of facts, which did not contest the degree of window tinting, the court found appellant guilty.

Before the Court of Special Appeals, appellant argued that police may not stop a vehicle based solely on the window tint unless the car is registered in Maryland. The State presented two arguments. First, that police have reasonable articulable suspicion to stop a vehicle under § 22-406 even if the car displays out of state license tags and that under *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1, the police may investigate further upon seeing the windows tinted in excess of the statutory regulation. Second, § 22-101(a)(1), which prohibits the operation of a vehicle in an unsafe condition, provides a basis for the police to stop the vehicle in question.

Held: Affirmed.

The Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to suppress the evidence seized by the police following the stop for a window tinting violation. The Court held that when the police have reasonable articulable suspicion that a vehicle on the highway has windows tinted beyond the permissible level, the

police may stop the vehicle to investigate the registration of that vehicle. That the vehicle may be registered in a foreign jurisdiction does not vitiate the lawfulness of the stop.

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Aaron Bradds & Samuel Hill v. Dionne Randolph, Warden, Nos. 77 & 78, September Term 2018, filed September 28, 2018. Opinion by Nazarian, J.

https://mdcourts.gov/data/opinions/cosa/2018/0077s18.pdf

BAIL REVIEW – REVISIONS TO MARYLAND RULES 2-416 AND 2-416.1

Facts:

Mr. Bradds was charged with first-degree burglary, third-degree burglary, fourth-degree burglary, malicious destruction of property, and theft between $100 and $1500 following allegations that he broke into the home of his brother's fiancée and stole a flat screen television and a digital camera and damaged the front door to the home. Mr. Bradds was arrested pursuant to a warrant.

When Mr. Bradds appeared before a district court commissioner, his bail was set at $25,000. He was unable to pay this amount and remained in jail awaiting a bail review hearing. At his bail review hearing, Mr. Bradds's counsel, the public defender, asked the court to convert Mr. Bradds's $25,000 secured bond to an unsecured bond. Counsel argued that Mr. Bradds did not have a steady job and had recently enrolled in a methadone treatment program. The court also reviewed Mr. Bradds's criminal history, which included six convictions for non-violent crimes, one probation before judgment, and eleven failures to appear. The State made no recommendation regarding bail or pretrial release. The court asked no additional questions about Mr. Bradds's ability to post bail, and the State offered no evidence suggesting that he could. The court noted that it had been leaning toward holding Mr. Bradds without bail, but instead increased the amount of his secured bond to $50,000.

The court then noted that, "**if** Mr. Bradds posts bond," he would be required to obey several release conditions. (Emphasis added.) Mr. Bradds was unable to obtain a bond and remained incarcerated in the Baltimore City jail.

Mr. Bradds filed a petition for writ of *habeas corpus* in the circuit court. In his supporting affidavit, he stated that he was twenty-seven years old, and that he helps to support his seven- and eleven-year-old children, as well as his grandparents, but had been unemployed for months, did not receive public benefits, did not have any assets, and could not afford bail. The State did not respond to his petition. The circuit court denied the petition, without a hearing, in an order filed on March 15, 2018. Mr. Bradds filed an application for leave to appeal the circuit court's denial of his petition for writ of *habeas corpus*, which was granted. His case was scheduled for trial in the circuit court on July 9, 2018.

Mr. Hill was charged with two counts of first-degree burglary, two counts of third-degree burglary, four counts of fourth-degree burglary, conspiracy to commit burglary, theft between $100 and $1500, malicious destruction of property, and reckless endangerment. He was alleged

to have broken into three properties in Baltimore City owned by the same person and stolen electronics, a water heater, and a kitchen stove. The removal of the water heater in one property resulted in flooding that caused significant damage, and the disconnection of the stove caused a serious gas leak. He was arrested pursuant to a warrant.

Mr. Hill's bail was set at $35,000 by a district court commissioner. He was unable to pay and remained in jail awaiting a bail review hearing. At the hearing, Mr. Hill's counsel, a public defender, and the pretrial services investigator both requested that Mr. Hill be released on his own recognizance with pretrial supervision. The State did not offer an alternate release plan. The court heard no information about Mr. Hill's employment, income, or assets. But the court did learn of Mr. Hill's criminal history, which included multiple convictions for theft and drugs in Maryland, as well as convictions in West Virginia for domestic violence, breaking and entering, daytime housebreak, shoplifting, and burglary.

At the close of the bail review hearing, the court declined the suggestion of pretrial services and defense counsel and raised Mr. Hill's bail to $50,000, payable at 10 percent. Mr. Hill could not afford the increased (or original) bail and remained incarcerated in the Baltimore City jail.

Mr. Hill filed a petition for a writ of *habeas corpus* in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. In his supporting affidavit, he stated that he is twenty-nine years old, unemployed, has no savings or assets, has more than $10,000 in personal debt, provides for his two-year-old son, is the sole caretaker of his mother who suffers from congestive heart failure, and could not afford bail. The State did not respond. The circuit court denied the petition without a hearing on March 15, 2018 and Mr. Hill filed an application for leave to appeal on March 23, 2018, which was granted. Mr. Hill's trial was set in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on June 27, 2018.

Held: Reversed and remanded.

The Court of Special Appeals held that the circuit court erred by defaulting to a cash bail as a special condition of release without individualized consideration of Messrs. Bradds's and Hill's respective abilities to pay.

Recently, the Court of Appeals updated the Maryland Rules regarding cash bail and considerations for pretrial release. Those changes took effect in July 2017. The revisions were in response to concerns and evidence that low-income defendants were being incarcerated pending trial merely because they could not afford financial conditions of release.

The updated Rules prioritize release over detention, release on own recognizance over release with conditions, and non-financial conditions over financial conditions. Even more to the point, the updated Rule 4-216.1 requires judicial officers to consider each defendant's individual circumstances when setting conditions for release, and specifically to consider "the ability of the defendant to meet a special condition of release with financial terms." Md. Rule 4-216.1(b)(2).

While the Court did not suggest that either Mr. Bradds or Mr. Hill was entitled to release before trial under the updated Rules (either might have been held due to the dangerousness of their crimes or prior failures to appear), the circuit court could not set a cash bail merely to prevent them from being released. Md. Rule 4-216.1(e)(1)(B).

Furthermore, the Court held that the circuit court should have considered other, less onerous, conditions of release to ensure appearance for trial before defaulting to a secured bail. Md. Rule 4-216.1(b)(1–4). And, if the circuit court decided that a secured bail was the least onerous condition likely to ensure appearance for trial, it should have undertaken an individualized consideration on the record of Mr. Bradds's and Mr. Hill's respective abilities to pay. Md. Rule 4-216.1(e).

State of Maryland v. Travis Sanders, No. 2742, September Term 2015, filed September 4, 2018. Opinion by Reed, J.

https://mdcourts.gov/data/opinions/cosa/2018/2742s15.pdf

MENTAL HEALTH – COMPETENCY – DISABILITIES AND PRIVILEGES OF MENTALLY DISORDERED PERSONS – INSANITY OR INCOMPETENCY AT TIME OF PROCEEDINGS – CRIMES – PLAIN LANGUAGE – PLAIN ORDINARY, OR COMMON MEANING

Facts:

Travis E. Sanders ("the appellee") was charged with numerous criminal offenses including—sex abuse of a minor, sex offense in the second degree, sex offense in the third degree, and second degree assault. After pleading not guilty and, in the alternative, not criminally responsible, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County ordered an evaluation of the appellee and found that he had a diagnosis of possible mental retardation. The appellee was committed to the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene ("the Department" or "the Health Department") on May 5, 2014, for an assessment of his competency to stand trial. The Health Department concluded that the appellee was not competent to stand trial and was a danger to himself or others. Accordingly, on July 22, 2014, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County found the appellee incompetent to stand trial and committed him to the Health Department as a danger to himself or others due to mental retardation (preferred term is intellectual disability).

During the appellee's stay at Spring Grove, a Spring Grove social worker assisted the appellee in applying for Developmental Disabilities Administration ("DDA") services. On March 30, 2015, DDA denied the appellee's application for services, concluding that he did not meet the statutory criteria for developmental disability. The report stated that the appellee was entitled to an appeal hearing.

A competency hearing was held on December 17, 2015. Appellee's counsel expressed that the DDA improperly denied the appellee's application for services. The circuit court agreed, finding the appellee to be incompetent, and ordering, among other things, that the appellee was eligible for DDA services.

Held: Judgment modified to remove the paragraph pertaining to Appellee's eligibility.

The circuit court exceeded its authority when it ruled that the appellee is eligible for DDA services. Pursuant to Criminal Procedure Article (CP) § 3-106(b)(1), the court has authority to require the Health Department to provide commitment-based services to defendants whom the court finds to be incompetent and, due to mental retardation or a mental disorder, a danger to

other persons, property, and themselves. Moreover, CP § 3-106(b)(2) provides "[i]f a court commits the defendant because of mental retardation, the Health Department shall require the Departmental Disabilities Administration to provide the care or treatment that the defendant needs." However, this provision clearly does not grant the court authority to determine one's eligibility for DDA services.

The statutory framework for post-commitment services places the eligibility determination in the hands of the Health Department. Applications for post-commitment DDA services are governed by Health General Article §§ 7-402 through 7-407 and is further delineated in Chapters 10.22.12.04 through .08 of the Code of Maryland Regulations. Based upon these statutory and regulatory provisions, it is clear that the legislature intended that determinations regarding an individual's eligibility for post-commitment DDA services be made by the Health Department.

In the instant case, the court issued an order ordering that the appellee be committed to the Health Department "until the [c]ourt is satisfied that the appellee is no longer incompetent to stand trial or is no longer a danger to self or the personal or property of others." The court exceeded its authority, however, when it ordered the appellee eligible for post-commitment DDA services.

Our holding does not suggest that the court lacks authority to determine a defendant's commitment for placement "in a Developmental Disabilities Administration facility until the Court is satisfied the Defendant is no longer incompetent to stand trial or is no longer a danger to self or the person or property of others." CP §3-106(b). However, the court lacks statutory authority to order that a defendant is eligible for DDA services beyond those related to a defendant's commitment to the Health Department under CP §3-106(b).

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John Schlick v. State of Maryland, No. 1376, September Term 2017, filed September 20, 2018. Opinion by Raker, J.

https://mdcourts.gov/data/opinions/cosa/2018/1376s17.pdf

SENTENCING AND PUNISHMENT ¬ RECONSIDERATION AND MODIFICATION OF SENTENCE – TIME FOR MOTION OR APPLICATION

Facts:

Appellant John Schlick filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. His petition was based upon his attorney's failure to file a timely Motion for Modification of Sentence. The post-conviction court granted relief and the remedy of permitting him to file a Motion for Modification of Sentence. Appellant filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City a motion to reconsider his sentence pursuant to Md. Rule 4-345. He filed his motion within five years of the imposition of his sentence, but the court scheduled a hearing outside of the five years referenced within the Rule. At the hearing, the court dismissed the motion on the ground that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion. Before the Court of Special Appeals, appellant argued that the trial court erred by dismissing his Motion for Modification of Sentence on the procedural grounds of Rule 4-345's five-year deadline. The State argued that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the motion once five years had passed since the imposition of sentence.

Held: Reversed.

The Court of Special Appeals held that although the five years allotted in Rule 4-345 had passed before the court's hearing on the Motion for Modification of Sentence, the trial court had the power to hear the motion. A defendant may file a petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file a timely Motion for Modification of Sentence under The Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act § 7-103(b) for ten years after sentencing. Md. Rule 4-345 provides the court with revisory power over sentencing for only five years after sentencing, an arguable conflict with the statute. The Court of Special Appeals held that under the circumstances presented by appellant, the five-year limitation for sentence reconsideration under the Rule is not a jurisdictional bar for the court to entertain the motion and that it was within the discretion of the court whether to hear the motion on the merits.

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Wallace & Gale Asbestos Settlement Trust v. William Edward Busch, Jr., et ux., No. 1055, September Term 2017, filed September 26, 2018. Opinion by Berger, J.

https://mdcourts.gov/data/opinions/cosa/2018/1055s17.pdf

PRODUCTS LIABILITY – ASBESTOS – BYSTANDER EXPOSURE – SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR CAUSATION – PRODUCT IDENTIFICATION – OPENING THE DOOR DOCTRINE – JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Facts:

William Edward Busch, Jr. ("Busch"), developed mesothelioma caused by occupational exposure to asbestos-containing insulation products. Busch and his wife, Kathleen, brought suit against, *inter alia*, Wallace and Gale Asbestos Settlement Trust ("WGAST"), the successor to the Wallace & Gale Co. ("W&G"), alleging that he was exposed to asbestos-containing insulation products installed by Wallace & Gale Co. ("W&G") during the construction of Loch Raven High School ("LRHS"), a project on which Busch worked as a steamfitter. The case ultimately proceeded to a jury trial against WGAST and Georgia-Pacific Company. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Busch against both defendants. Both WGAST and Georgia-Pacific noted appeals, but Georgia Pacific subsequently settled with the plaintiffs.

At issue before the trial court and on appeal was whether Busch had presented sufficient evidence to allow the case to reach the jury. Certain facts were not in dispute, specifically that: Busch worked on the LRHS site for multiple months; Busch worked primarily in the boiler room during the construction of LRHS; while in the boiler room, Busch was exposed to dust created when magnesia block insulation was cut; magnesia block insulation was used to insulate the boilers at LRHS; the magnesia block insulation contained asbestos; the magnesia block insulation was coated with asbestos containing cement; Busch ultimately developed mesothelioma; and the asbestos-containing magnesia block and cement contributed to the development of Busch's mesothelioma. WGAST argued that this evidence was insufficient to allow the case to go to the jury, but the circuit court disagreed. Additional issues arose at trial relating to evidence of another defendant's dismissal, the scope of evidence admitted about W&G's involvement during the construction of LRHS, WGAST's proposed jury instruction on fiber drift, and WGAST's proposed jury instruction relating to interrogatory responses and statements in Busch's complaints.

Held: Affirmed.

On appeal, WGAST argued that insufficient evidence was presented upon which a reasonable jury could conclude that W&G was responsible for the supply and/or installation of asbestos-containing magnesia block during the construction of LRHS. WGAST focused on the

"frequency, regularity, and proximity" test for substantial factor causation set forth in *Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Balbos*, 326 Md. 179, 210 (1992). The Court of Special Appeals explained that this case was actually one of product identification, emphasizing that the parties agreed that Busch had been exposed to asbestos-containing magnesia block in the LRHS boiler room, but that whether W&G had installed the magnesia block was in dispute.

WGAST asserted that the evidence produced at trial failed to specifically place Busch near W&G installers using asbestos-containing materials. The Court of Special Appeals rejected WGAST's assertion, concluding that the evidence, though slight, was sufficient to allow the case to go to the jury. The Court of Special Appeals observed that time sheets demonstrated that W&G insulators worked on Job #5679 for over 4,500 man hours during the time period when Busch worked in the boiler room and partial building statements indicated that W&G performed work associated with "insulat[ing] various plumbing, heating and ventilating surfaces" at LRHS. The Court of Special Appeals further observed that specific invoices documenting W&G's work totaled less than $20,000, but the value of Job #5679 was over $145,000. In addition, a partial billing specifically placed W&G insulators in the boiler room for the insulation of fire lines. The Court held that this evidence could have led a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that W&G was the primary, if not the only, insulator working at LRHS during the critical time period. The Court explained that, given the significant number of hours W&G performed insulation services at LRHS, a fact-finder could have reasonably inferred that W&G was responsible for the installation of the asbestos-containing magnesia block insulation as well.

The Court of Special Appeals further addressed four issues relating to evidentiary determinations and jury instructions. At trial, WGAST admitted into evidence various documents relating to the history of the current lawsuit as well as other asbestos litigation, which identified for the jury all of the defendants initially named in Busch's initial Complaint, as well as all entities that had gone bankrupt over the prior twenty-five years and could not be named, and all parties who were thought by Busch to be responsible for contributing to the development of his mesothelioma at various stages of the litigation. In response, Busch sought to admit the stipulation of dismissal for defendant McCormick. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by applying the "opening the door doctrine" and permitting Busch to inform the jury that McCormick had been dismissed as a defendant.

WGAST further argued on appeal that the circuit court's admission of W&G documents pertaining to times when Busch was not working at the LRHS site was erroneous and prejudicial. The Court of Special Appeals explained that the extent of the work performed by W&G at LRHS was a significant issue presented at trial, and, therefore, that the circuit court did not err by permitting Busch to present evidence of the significant amount of work performed by W&G at LRHS.

WGAST raised two appellate issues relating to jury instructions. WGAST argued that the court erred by refusing to propound its requested jury instructions on fiber drift theory and about the evidentiary weight of Busch's interrogatory responses and statements in Busch's complaints. The Court of Special Appeals held that the circuit court did not err in concluding that the fiber drift instruction was not generated by the evidence. The Court of Special Appeals further held

that the circuit court acted within its discretion when determining that WGAST's proposed instructions about the evidentiary weight of interrogatories and complaints were likely to confuse the jury. The Court, therefore, held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by crafting an instruction very slightly different from the verbatim text proposed by WGAST.

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ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE

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By an Order of the Court of Appeals dated September 6, 2018, the following attorney has been disbarred by consent:

STEVEN DOUGLAS SHEMENSKI

*

By an Order of the Court of Appeals dated September 28, 2018, the following attorney has been indefinitely suspended:

KIMBERLY LISA MARSHALL

*

By an Order of the Court of Appeals, dated September 28, 2018, the following attorney has been indefinitely suspended by consent:

AUBREY PAIGE POPPLETON

*

By and Order of the Court of Appeals dated September 29, 2018, the following attorney has been indefinitely suspended by consent:

LUIS F. SALGADO

*

This is to certify that the name of

SAMUEL SPERLING

has been replaced upon the register of attorneys in this State as of September 28, 2018.

*

*

By an Order of the Court of Appeals dated September 28, 2018, the following attorney has been indefinitely suspended by consent:

MELINDA GALE TELL

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The full text of Court of Special Appeals unreported opinions can be found online:

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